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Abstract: Back-haul problems occur in many areas of transportation. One way rental of 
equipment often takes it from an area of high demand to an area of low demand. 
Examples include container rentals, car rentals and other cases of mobile equipment. The 
problem is to return the equipment to the location of need. Typically this is viewed as an 
administrative and scheduling problem. The approach taken here is "decentralized" in 
which a specially designed market organizes competition and information to minimize 
the cost of back-hauls without the direct intervention of administrative negotiations or 
command-and-control types of scheduling. Laboratory experimental methods are 
employed to test the concept and explore its limitations. 
Introduction 
The back-haul problem is well known to management in many areas of transportation. 
The problem occurs when use of equipment involves its relocation, and it must be 
relocated again before it can be used again. Getting the equipment back to where it is 
needed is costly. For example, a customer who rents an international freight container or 
a moving truck may have the option to return it at a distant location. The owner may be 
able to rent it to another customer at its new location. However, if there is currently no 
demand at the return location, then the owner may need to back-haul rental units to a 
location where there is sufficient demand. Naturally occurring patterns of trade can create 
situations where back-haul is common. 
When the owner of the rental units is also the owner of the least-cost transportation, the 
back-haul problem is merely one of optimization by a single agent. However, if the 
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owner of the rental units must contract for the transportation from a number of providers, 
how can the owner attempt to attain a least cost outcome? Classically the problem is 
considered from the point of view of uncertainties and the complexities of scheduling. 
Here we add the complexity of asymmetric information in the sense that costs are known 
only to those hired to undertake the movements. Classically the problem is considered 
from the point of view of a single decision maker who formulates the problem on the best 
information available and makes a decision. By contrast this paper outlines a process for 
making such decisions and the heart of the process is a new, decentralized, "smart" 
auction process. 
Practical advantages are derived from the competition and self-selection features of 
auctions. The term "smart" auction refers to an auction where a computer solves the 
complex combinatorial problem implicit in back-haul problems and reports the potential 
winning bidders. The feasibility of the idea is tested by application of new experimental 
techniques found in laboratory experimental economics. 
The problem to be considered has two central features. First, the back-haul might be 
most efficiently achieved by some combination of several different transportation 
providers, each of which deals with only part of the entire stock that might be moved. 
Secondly, the costs of providers are unknown to the firm that wants to procure the back­
haul services. The implication of the first is that the cost minimizing allocation will 
require some combination of appropriately coordinated service providers. The 
implication of the second is that the acquiring firm must use some form of competition in 
order to minimize costs. Previous smart market designs found in the literature3 show 
promise in addressing these general issues in environments that differ significantly from 
the back-haul environment. The smart market outlined below is designed to solve these 
two problems in the back-haul environment. 
Intuitively the process will operate through iterative periods of competition in which 
competing sellers will adjust their services and charges to "fit" into a least cost 
combination of transportation charges when meshed with the buyer's cost savings 
information. The buyer (rental company) posts a cost function giving the costs that they 
face if containers are not moved. These costs are a sum of storage costs at sink locations 
and opportunity costs for missed rentals at source locations. The sellers (transportation 
providers) are then involved in an iterative bidding process that resembles a 1st price 
procurement auction. Sellers post asking prices for moving units along particular routes. 
A computer will evaluate these offers in light of the cost function, and announce a set of 
potential winners and losers. The process will continue until no seller wishes to ask a 
3 McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith(1 987) begins the exploration of a uniform price market design for 
gas/electric transportation networks that is continued in a series of later papers, but their market does not 
involve multiple routes between sources and destination that will be present in the back-haul problem. Our 
auction design will also allow all-or-nothing contracts, which may aid in situations where a competitive 
equilibrium does not exist at the price of introducing combinatorial optimization problems to the operation 
of the auction. See Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1 982), Banks, et.al. ( 1989), Olson and Porter (1994), 
Brewer and Plott(1 996), and Plott and Porter(1 997), and Brewer(l 998) for other examples of 
combinatorial auctions. 
2 
lower price for their transportation services. At that point, the potential allocation will 
become the actual allocation, and sellers will collect on their transportation contracts. 
This paper reports on three fundamental questions. First, what is the formal 
representation of the process? Since this is not an auction of the usual sort, its 
dimensions must be made clear. Secondly, how will the process be defined in operational 
terms? Exactly what is known to participants and exactly how the auction works must be 
explained. Third, will it do what it is supposed to do? Since the tests of the auction uses 
laboratory experimental techniques some explanation is needed about how they are 
applied and what is learned from their application. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II will present some major 
features of testbed and experimental methodology. Section III will provide needed 
background, notation, and concepts and discuss the class of transportation and backhaul 
problems under consideration. Section IV will define a formal testbed problem that will 
contain elements that any procurement auction must address. Section V will provide the 
rules of the smart procurement auction to be tested in this paper. Section VI presents 
theoretical cost and transportation benchmarks from competitive and monopsony theory. 
These benchmarks are not models of the auction, but rather are standards of performance 
to which we can compare the outcomes of the auction. Section VII presents experimental 
procedures. Section VIII presents the results. Section IX presents conclusions, and 
suggests avenues for future exploration. 
II. LABORATORY TESTBED METHODOLOGY 
The use of laboratory experimental techniques to "testbed" new types of processes is 
rapidly gaining in popularity. The idea is to create and implement prototypes of the 
process in laboratory environments. Individuals motivated by financial incentives 
compete under conditions that are controlled and understood from the point of view of 
the experimenter. 
Such an exercise addresses several important issues. First, the fact that a prototype is 
constructed demonstrates that the ideas that support the process can be given a concrete 
and operational incarnation. That is, the abstract concepts have been replaced with real 
things and the concepts have an internal consistency. Secondly, the operations of the 
process can be studied and one can determine if the process performed as it was supposed 
to perform. It is a type of proof of principle. Does the process do what it is supposed to 
do? Thirdly, one can examine design consistency - asking whether the results were 
understandable in terms of the basic principles used in the design of the process or if the 
results were due to lucky chance. The role of "design consistency" in evaluating market 
prototypes is becoming well established (Plott, 1994). If a process is going to be scaled 
up to a business level it should be working for the right reasons, otherwise there is little 
reason to think that the results will survive the scaling. Finally, obtaining these answers 
is inexpensive when laboratory experimental methods are employed. Badly conceived, 
incompletely conceived or internally inconsistent processes will reveal themselves when 
it is not costly. Processes based on unreliable principles can be exposed through 
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inexpensive tests. The idea of testbeds is simply to provide a "first pass" at developing 
new methods of doing business. 
The basic "testbed" approach to testing allocation mechanism has precedence in the 
literature. This approach, initially described in Plott(1994) has been successfully applied 
in Brewer and Plott(l 996) with regard to the BICAP auction for access to railroad tracks 
and in Plott and Porter(l 996) with regard to auctions for access to NASA space station 
resources are accounts of the use of the procedure. 
Testbeds involve three elements. The first is an environment that contains economic 
parameters of a model economic problem that is to be solved. This is outlined in section 
IV. The second element is the mechanism that is to be implemented - the prototype 
process. In this case it is a backhaul auction process to be developed and outlined in 
detail in Section V. Third is the set of criteria or performance measures by which 
performance of the mechanism is to be evaluated together with existing ideas about why 
the mechanism might perform as expected. The criteria are contained in Section VI. 
In this case, four benchmarks are employed as standards for performance evaluation. The 
first is the lowest cost possibility, which is the case of vertical integration in which the 
purchasing firm has all of the cost functions of all providers and also has the power to 
administer what they do. The second benchmark is a monopsony in which the purchasing 
firm knows each provider's costs but must use similar payment terms with each provider. 
Two cases, single price and nonlinear pricing, are considered for the monopsony, who 
chooses prices strategically to obtain low costs. The third is the competitive model in 
which the derived demand from the firm's cost savings is in equilibrium with providers' 
marginal cost of transportation. The final benchmark involves sequential contracts, with 
the buyer meeting with each transportation provider in a sequence and, at each meeting, 
arranging a contract that maximizes total surplus in a myopic, non-forward looking, 
fashion. These benchmarks represent difficult challenges. Each assumes that either the 
buyer has information and/or powers that it does not have, or that competitive or strategic 
processes can operate in a way that is a bit unusual when there is only one buyer and only 
a few sellers. 
III. BACKGROUND, NOTATION AND CONCEPTS 
The purpose of this section is to roughly define a class of transportation environments in 
terms sufficient to explore the economic issues that are involved without overwhelming 
the reader with too much detail. Later sections will develop notation and detail needed for 
defining an experimental testbed and performing rigorous analysis. 
Figure 1 shows a transportation problem that is trivial from size perspective but contains 
important challenges common across a wide class of transport management problems. 
Many environments involving the transport of homogeneous goods can be described by a 
figure similar in spirit to Figure 1. 
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In the figure, locations A and B have product waiting to be picked up, whereas locations 
D4 and E are empty and are waiting for product to be delivered. The properties of a 
particular location are described with three parameters: a capacity K, the current stock S, 
and the target level T. Capacity K and stock S are physical properties. In contrast, the 
desired target level T depends on the economic property of a location as a pickup or 
delivery location and on local business conditions (which we take to be exogenous). 
From the labels on Figure 1, one can see that the principal' s target is to have the entire 
product at warehouses A (30 units) and B (30 additional units) picked up and delivered to 
the empty warehouses at locations D and E, which can each hold 30 units. 
Agents 
Two classes of agents operate in the environment of Figure 1: a single principal agent 
(denoted P) and several transportation provider agents (an individual agent denoted ti). 
In figure 1, a principal agent P owns the units of goods located at the warehouses at 
locations A, B, D, and E. The principal agent knows the capacities, current stock, and 
target levels at each warehouse, and knows what costs he faces if target levels of units are 
not met. 
However, the principal agent can not move units. He must contract with transportation 
provider agents to move the units. 
The transportation agents face costs for moving units. Costs vary from agent to agent and 
from route to route. Except where noted, each transportation agent's costs are private 
information known only to that agent. 
Summary of Principal's Management Problem 
The principal attempts to solve a cost minimization problem of the following form: 
Choose a transportation strategy to 
MINIMIZE 
Principal's Total Cost = Cost of Moving Units + Cost of Unmoved Units 
with respect to constraints: 
(i) at each pickup location, units picked up can not exceed total stock of units 
(ii) at each delivery location, units delivered can not exceed warehouse capacity 
K. 
(iii) total units picked up must equal total units delivered 
Put briefly, choosing a transportation strategy means that the principal will choose how 
many units to move at each location. This movement choice, along with the initial stock 
at each location, will give rise to a final level of stock at each location. The principal 
faces a tradeoff between costs for moving units and costs for not meeting targets. The 
constraints upon the principal is essentially that units can not be created or destroyed 
4 'C' was not chosen to identify a location, to avoid confusion with later uses of 'C' to represent cost. 
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(total pickups can not exceed stock, and total pickups must equal total deliveries) and that 
the warehouse capacities can not be exceeded. 
The complexity of this problem is suggested by the numerous variables on which the 
moving costs and the unmoved costs might depend. Clearly, the cost of moving units 
depends not only upon the number moved but also upon details of negotiation between 
the principal and the transportation providers. 
Some initial insight into the problem can be obtained by separating the details of routing 
from the resulting movements. Distinguishing between these notions, as made clear in the 
next section, results in certain simplifications. This division of details is also used later in 
the design of the smart auction. 
Principal' s Choices: Movements vs. Routing 
The principal must somehow choose how many units to move at each location. There are 
two levels of detail at which this choice can occur. The principal might specify a 
movement vector or a routing vector. The difference between these two specifications is 
illustrated below. 
Definition. A movement vector M = (MA, MB, Mn, ME) is a vector giving the net change 
in the number of units at each location. 
Note that sign determines whether units being moved are pickups or deliveries. For 
example, if M=(-20,-25,30,15), then 20 units are to be picked up at location A, 25 units 
are to be picked up at location B, 30 unitE? are to be delivered to location D, and 15 units 
are to be delivered to location E. 
Definition. A routing vector r = (rad, rae, rbd, rbe) gives the number of units to be moved 
along each route in the transportation network. 
A routing vector is more specific than a movement vector. For any particular movement 
vector, there are many routing vectors that can achieve it. Figure 2 gives an example, 
showing how two different routing vectors r and r' can result in the same movement 
vectorM. 
Properties of Testbed Environment 
Four simple properties can be used to summarize this broad class of transportation 
environments. These mostly involve noticing what components of principal' s or 
transportation provider's  cost depend on moving vs. routing vectors. These properties act 
to summarize certain relationships that will become useful when choosing a bidding 
mechanism. 
Property 1. In the testbed environment, a target movement vector can be defined as MT = 
T - S, where the vectors T and S give the target level and current stock at each location. 
However a target routing vector is not uniquely specified given the movement vector as 
many routing vectors result in the same movement vector. 
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Property 2. Principal's costs of unmoved units (not meeting targets) depend only upon the 
difference (MT-M) between the target movement vector MT and the chosen movement 
vectorM. 
Property 3. A transportation provider's costs of moving units will depend upon the 
routing vector ri chosen by that provider. 
Property 4. The principal's costs of moving units depend upon the details of contracts 
between the principal and the transportation providers and the routing vector selected as a 
result of these contracts. 
IV. THE EXPERIMENTAL TESTBED 
The purpose of this section is to describe the testbed environments used in the 
experiments that follow. 
The arrangement of pick up and drop off locations is the same as shown in Figure 1, i.e. 
X = set of locations = {A,B,D,E}, 
Xpick = set of pick up locations = { A,B}, and 
Xdrop = set of drop off locations = {D,E}. 
Agents have the same role as in the example, only now we will be specific about how 
many transportation agents there are and their cost functions for moving units. There is a 
principal agent P who wishes to obtain transportation from 12 transport agents t1 .. t11 . 
Thus, I = set of agents = { P , t1 , t2 , . .  ., t11} 
Principal's cost parameters. 
The principal' s cost function is 
Cp = pmoving(M) + Cp unmoved(MT-M) 
where MT is the target movement vector and M is the movement vector chosen by the 
principal agent. The price P(M) paid to the transportation agents for moving the units 
will be determined in the experiments using a bidding mechanism to be described in the 
next section. The cost of unmoved units, Cp unmoved(MT-M), for this initial series of 
experiments, was chosen to have the quadratic form shown below: 
Cp unmoved(MT-M) = 4j j(M7' -M)l 12 = 4 L (T'.r - Sx - Mx )2 xeX 
Transportation agent cost parameters 
The cost functions of each transportation provider are given in Table 1. Each row of the 
table shows thy marginal cost functions of one particular agent. Costs of moving units 
over separate routes are additive. For example, if agent 5 moves 2 units along route ad 
and 3 units along route ae, then agent 5 's cost is ( 45+ 180=225) along route ad and 
(144+216+300=660) along route ae, for a total cost of 225+660=885. 
The cost functions of the various transportation agents were chosen as unrecognizable 
pieces of a linear total supply function. This relationship can be seen in Table 2. Let 
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_[v]_ be the largest integer less than or equal to v (i.e. "rounding down"). Then the 
aggregate supply function for each route is as follows: 
SAD(P AD) = _[P AD/9]_ 
SAE(P AE) = _(P AE/12]_ 
SBD(PBD) = _[PBD/11 ]_ 
SBE(PBE) = _[PBE/6]_ 
V. THE COMBINATORIAL BACHKAUL AUCTION MECHANISM 
The Combinatorial Backhaul (CB) Auction is described by the following set of rules. 
1. At each point in time, each transportation agent in the auction may have exactly one 
standing ask, of the form Ai = (ti, Pb MiA, Mm, Mm, Mm), where Pi is the price 
requested by agent ti to remove MiA units from location A, remove Mm units from 
location B, deliver Mic units to location C and deliver Mm units to location D. 
2. The auction starts with a null initial ask (th 0, 0, 0 ,0 ,0 ) from each agent. 
3. At each point in the auction, a computer calculates the set of asks that minimizes total 
costs to the principal agent P. This set of asks is called the potential allocation, and 
the cost to the principal agent is called the potential principal cost. 
4. An agent ti is allowed to replace his ask Ai with a new ask Ai* only if the effect on the 
potential principal cost is non-increasing. 
5. If To seconds elapse without an acceptable new ask from some agent, then the auction 
is concluded. The potential allocation becomes the final transportation contract. The 
principal must pay the transportation agents, and these agents must deliver the 
transportation services. 
A central computer oversees the rules of the procurement auction. The auction operates 
as follows. Before the auction opens, the principal posts the cost function Cp 
UNMOVED and 
the target movement vector MT to a public information area of the computer. When the 
auction opens, a timer is started at 60 seconds. Agents may submit asks consisting of a 
requested price for providing some movement vector of units. The computer determines 
whether this ask would be tentatively accepted or rejected, and, if not rejected, reports the 
new ask along with the potential allocation information to all agents. At any time, agents 
may revise their ask in a manner that is cost-decreasing to the principal, i.e. they may 
offer a lower price or offer to move more units for the same price. A soft termination rule 
is used, similar to the "going-going-gone" of oral auctions: the auction continues until the 
timer expires, but each new ask that is included into the potential allocation resets the 
timer for another 60 seconds. Therefore, the auction ends when no agent submits a cost­
improving ask. 
The following intuition plays a role in suggesting this particular auction organization. 
From Properties 1-4 of the preceding section, we see that the principal' s cost function can 
be broken up into components according to whether movement or routing vectors are 
important. Details of routing are among the issues that determine transportation 
provider's costs but only movement is relevant to the principal. Thus, the auction is 
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designed to let transportation providers determine the details of routing, with competition 
driving these providers to select lower cost routings over higher cost alternatives. 
Through asks, the transportation providers input the costs of movement for a computer to 
compare against the principal's cost of not moving units. The soft-closure action of the 
timer should assist in encouraging competition and terminating the auction when further 
cost-lowering is not possible. 
VI. THEORETICAL BENCHMARKS AND STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE 
The purpose of this section is to provide some theoretical benchmarks against which to 
judge the behavior of the combinatorial backhaul auction observed in the experiments of 
the next section. These benchmarks are derived using standard assumptions of full­
information and optimization on the part of agents and thus represent quite a challenge 
for a mechanism that will operate in an environment where agents have sparsely 
distributed information and perhaps do not fully optimize. 
In order of increasing cost to the principal agent, the benchmarks include vertical 
integration (VI), nonlinear pricing monopsony (4P+Q), single price monopsony (IP), 
competitive equilibrium (CE), and sequential contracting (SC). A brief definition of each 
of these benchmarks is given below. The definitions are standard. 
Calculations of benchmarks involved brute force optimization via computer, and 
therefore are not shown in detail. A sense of the process can be seen in the Figures 3-6 
and Table 3. Figures 3-6 show the costs of procuring transportation along the various 
routes, using some of the benchmarks shown below. Table 3 shows similar calculations 
for a nonlinear monopsony pricing model. In each case, these figures represent 
intermediate results that give the cost of transporting units along a particular route. The 
benchmarks in Table 4 are then obtained by comparing the principal' s total cost over 
every possible movement and routing vector. 
Table 4 summarizes the outcome at each theoretical benchmark. The table can be read as 
follows: for vertical integration, the principal will face a total cost CP of 3374 consisting 
of a cost of 2574 for moving units and cost of 800 for unmoved units. This least cost is 
achieved when 22 units are picked up from A, and of these, 13 delivered to D and 9 to E; 
and 24 units are picked up from B with 9 of these delivered to D and 15 to E. The totals 
delivered to a location are shown in parenthesis, e.g. under VI, a total of (22) units will be 
delivered to D and (24) delivered to E. Since the principal does not pay a constant price 
to the agents under vertical integration, we do not report a price per unit moved. 
However, in the l P  and CE benchmarks the relevant constant prices are reported. 
Vertical Integration (VI) 
Under vertical integration, the principal P controls each transportation agent ti and 
therefore pays only the minimum cost of any desired transportation. Because the 
transportation agents operate at zero profit, the marginal procurement cost curve along a 
particular route is identical to the supply function for that route. The vertical integration 
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cost benchmark is unique among the four we will use, because it involves the 
mathematically lowest cost. It is impossible to find a collection of contracts with lower 
total costs without forcing the transportation providers to operate at a loss. 
Monopsony 
Under monopsony, the principal P and transportation agents ti are independent. The 
principal chooses parameters of a pricing contract, and the agents decide whether to move 
0, 1, or more units under this contract. Two types of contracts are considered, one-price 
(lP) and nonlinear pricing ( 4P+Q). 
- One-Price(lP) Monopsony 
The principal chooses a price to pay per unit of transportation for each route, resulting in 
a 4-tuple of prices (PAD, P AEo P80, PsE). This is called a "one-price" contract because 
there is no price discrimination over quantity moved or over individual agents. Different 
agents moving units on the same route receive the same price per unit moved. 
- Nonlinear Pricing (4P+Q) Monopsony 
The principal chooses a vector of prices to pay for various levels of transportation along 
each route. The name 4P+Q for this benchmark indicates that the principal may choose 4 
prices for each route, plus a quota of contracts of each type to accept along that particular 
route should supply exceed the principal's needs. On each particular route a principal 
chooses a vector P = (P(l),P(2),P(3),P(4)) of prices to offer for moving 1, 2, 3, or 4 units 
along that particular route as well as a vector of quotas Q = (Q(l), Q(2), Q(3), Q(4)) of 
each contract type. In total, the principal chooses a total of 16 prices contained in the 
four vectors PAD, PAE, PBn, PBE and 16 quotas contained in four vectors QAn, QAE, QBn, 
QBE· Notice that although the principal can engage in quantity-based price 
discrimination, he can not offer different prices to agents on any other criteria. 
Competitive Equilibrium 
A competitive equilibrium exists at the prices shown in Table 4. In competitive 
equilibrium, the principal pays a single price for all units moved along a particular route. 
The price along a particular route is such that the principal's  demand for transportation, 
as derived from marginal cost savings, exactly equals the aggregate supply of 
transportation, as derived from marginal transportation costs. The equilibrium shown 
supports the least cost allocation of contracts. The movements of units are identical to 
those in least cost vertical integration. Because the principal does not capture the 
transporters' surplus, the total cost to the principal is much higher than in vertical 
integration. 
Sequential Contracting (SC) 
Under sequential contracting, the principal P negotiates with each transportation agent in 
sequence. That is, first P meets with t1, then P meets with t1, etc. At each meeting, 
the pair first considers route A to D, then route A to E, then route B to D, then route B to 
E. For purposes of creating a benchmark, assume that each meeting results in a contract 
1 0  
that, given information available at that moment5, reflects the greatest possible benefits 
from exchange. Prices for transportation services need only satisfy voluntary 
participation, implying a broad range of contract prices is possible: the principal could 
pay as little as the transportation provider's marginal cost or the principal could pay as 
much as his entire cost savings. While there is a range of possible total costs of moving 
the units under this benchmark, the number of units to be moved is rigidly defined. 
Under sequential contracting, because the principal faces a high initial marginal cost of 
unmoved units and ignores future contract possibilities in his sequential maximization, he 
buys too much transportation in initial meetings. This results in much higher levels of 
movement than in any of the other benchmarks. Inefficiencies occur because the 
principal does not buy strictly from the lowest cost providers. 
Allowing the principal to somehow renegotiate the initial contracts could tend to increase 
efficiency and lower costs. This is part of what we seek to accomplish automatically by 
designing a smart auction. Thus, the smart auction should hopefully provide consistently 
lower total costs than the sequential contracting benchmarks even if it can not attain low 
levels of cost associated with monopsony or vertical integration. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
The purpose of this section is to describe procedures used in conducting the experiments, 
whose results will be presented in the next section. A total of 7 experiments were 
conducted. The parameter choices along with basic properties of the data such as time 
periods and numbers of trades are summarized in Table 5. 
Instructions 
In each experiment, subjects were given the instructions found in the Appendix together 
with a cost information sheet (essentially, each agent sees a single row from Table 1) and 
forms to fill out to calculate their profits from any transportation contracts they might be 
awarded. 
Data Issues: Paper vs. Computer 
The form of the data generated in the experiment plays a role in determining convenient 
forms of initial analysis. In the experiments the subject's  costs for transporting units 
along each route were provided on paper, along with extra sheets for recording revenues, 
costs, and profits from any transportation contracts awarded during the experiment. Each 
subject's paper work was checked for correctness at the end of each period. The 
computerized data consists of all asks entered into the auction along with the final 
outcome. 
The choice to computerize only the auction institution and not the entire experiment 
involves a number of tradeoffs, both between programming labor and experimental data 
production as well as the level of generality of experiments that can be performed. This 
led to a design where the most convenient experimental data to analyze corresponds to 
5 Specifically, the principal does not consider what future contracts may be possible with the other agents, 
who have not yet been met. 
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the principal' s point of view rather than to either the transportation agent' s  point of view 
or a global point of view. 
Software Issues 
The combinatorial backhaul auction was implemented as a web-page server system 
compatible with Netscape Navigator. The experimenter ran a web server on a computer 
that served as the control system, and each subject ran a copy of Netscape Navigator on 
standard windows-based PCs. 
It can be difficult to use the web to design interactive markets, because ordinarily web 
technologies are based on pull. That is, they retrieve information only upon receiving 
specific requests from the user. This is a problem in a fast moving, continuous market, as 
it can be tiresome for the user to constantly request updates to the information on his 
screen, and almost impossible for the experimenter to know what information is on each 
user's screen. Therefore, there were significant technical challenges that had to be 
overcome in order to create a continuous market over the web. 
Our software was specially designed to take advantage of special client-pull/server-push 
Netscape features which continuously updated information on the subjects screens, rather 
than relying upon subjects to request new information. Two versions of the software are 
worth distinguishing. 
Experiments 1-3 were performed with version 1 of the software. In this version, 
watching the market information and submitting a new ask were separate activities that 
appeared on separate web 'pages. This issue is worth noting because while a subject was 
busy entering an order, they could not normally see the latest orders of others. Some 
subjects switched back and forth between the two web pages - which took time, while 
more computer literate subjects simply ran two copies of the Netscape program. Those 
who ran two copies of Netscape were able to see the latest orders in one window while 
they worked on entering their own order in another window. 
Experiments 4-7 were performed with version 2 of the software. This version merged the 
various web pages by using the frames feature of Netscape. Subjects were able to both 
watch the activity and place new orders without having to switch web pages or otherwise 
manipulate the computer. 
The result of this minor software change appears to be somewhat dramatic in terms of 
order flow and length of periods. Table 5 shows the number of asks to increase by a 
factor of 2 to 3 with the change in screen design from Experiments 1-3 to Experiments 4-
7. It is interesting to note that the increased flow of asks does not cause the auction to 
end sooner. 
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Table 6 reports the raw data for the experiments. The table is broken up into two sections 
according to the demand target movement vector in the testbed. Recall that the different 
movement target vectors correspond to different cost functions for the principal on the 
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demand side of the environment, and should lead to different allocations m the 
mechanism. 
Each row of the table corresponds to the final outcome of a specific experimental period. 
The entries on each row are, from left to right, the costs to the principal for moving and 
not moving units, and the final allocation of transportation contracts that give rise to these 
costs. For example, in period 1 of experiment 1, the total cost to the principal was 7349, 
consisting of a cost of 5325 paid to the subjects (transportation providers) for moving 
units, and 2024 paid for the units that were unmoved. 3 9 units were moved, with 16 
picked up at location A and 23 picked up at location B .  Of these 39 units, 15 were 
delivered to D and 24 to E6. 
The pattern of results that follow compares the data reported in Table 6 to the theoretical 
benchmarks reported in Table 4. Comparisons will be made in three areas: principal' s 
total cost, the relationship between moving costs and unmoved costs, and the flow of 
units. The goal is not to falsify any of the benchmarks as models but simply to use them 
as reference points in evaluating the total costs observed in the experiments. In addition, 
details of movement or routing in the benchmarks may help in further understanding the 
observed outcomes in the combinatorial backhaul auction experiments. 
Result 1. Total costs of procurement in the combinatorial backhaul auction tend to be (a) 
below the sequential contracting benchmark, (b) within I 0% of the competitive 
benchmark and ( c) generally exceed the monopsony benchmarks and therefore exceed 
the minimum possible cost. 
Support. Figure 7 provides a visual comparison of the principal' s total costs observed in 
the experiments with the competitive equilibrium (CE), monoposny (IP, 4P+Q) and 
vertical integration (VI) benchmarks. (a) Only 3 of 31 (10%) periods are above the lower 
range of the sequential contracting (SC) benchmark in costs. These 3 occur under the 30-
30-30-30 target (SC benchmark cost: 7500-14400) and are Experiment 1 Period 2 (total 
cost: 7860), Exp. 3 Per. 3 (total cost: 7883) and Exp. 4 Per. I (total cost: 8294). For all 
other cases the total cost is lower than the SC benchmark. (b) For the 30-30-30-30 target 
one can see that of the 2I total experiment-period observations, 3 observations are strictly 
within the CE band7 of 5642-5985, and I5 observations are within 10% of the CE band 
(i.e., 5078-6583). For the 30-30-20-40 target one can see that of the IO total observations, 
only one observation is strictly within the CE band of 6019-6239, and 7 are within 10% 
of the CE band (i.e., 5417-6862). If the data is pooled across both target levels, 22 of 31 
periods (71 % ) of the periods have principal' s final costs within 10% of the CE outcome, 
with the other 9 of 31 (29%) periods having costs greater than 10% above the CE range. 
(c) In the 30-30-30-30 environment, the IP Monopsony benchmark is a total cost of 
52I8. Of the 2I observations for target 30-30-30-30, only 2 (Exp. 6 Per. 2, TC 5I26 and 
Exp. 7 Per. I, TC 5I7I) are below the IP monopsony benchmark. In the 30-30-20-40 
environment, the IP Monopsony benchmark is a total cost of 5493. Of the IO 
6 It is worth reminding the reader that the routing of units is unobservable in the mechanism and is not 
reported. Thus, the table here lacks the routing detail present in Table 3 .  
7 Recall that the CE benchmark involves a closed interval of values rather than a single number, because 
there is a range of market clearing prices rather than a unique price. 
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observations, only one, Exp. 4. Per. 5 (TC: 5436) is below the lP monopsony benchmark. 
None of the experimental observations are below the 4P+Q Monopsony benchmark.• 
Result 2. Comparisons of the cost of moving units (awarded procurement contracts) vs. 
the cost of unmoved units at the end of each experimental period tend to be more 
consistent with the competitive benchmark than with the other benchmarks. 
Support. Figure 8 shows the relevant comparisons. Note that the lP and 4P+Q 
monopsony benchmarks tend to decrease total costs by bearing a higher cost for unmoved 
units while manipulating the contract prices to achieve lowered moving costs. In general, 
the total cost of the moving contracts tends to be near the CE benchmark with a higher 
cost for unmoved units moved than would be expected at the CE. With one exception 
(Exp. 4 Per. 1), the cost tradeoff data is not at all consistent with any of the monopsony or 
vertical integration benchmarks. The SC benchmark is off the scale to the right in each 
case, and none of the experimental outcomes approaches this benchmark• 
Result 3. Flows of units in the combinatorial backhaul auction are closer to the 
competitiveNI benchmark (30-30-30-30 case) than to any monopsony benchmark. 
Support. Table 7 compares the observed flows from transportation contracts with the 
theoretical benchmarks. Table 7 A examines the data for experimental periods involving 
the 30-30-30-30 target, whereas Table 7B examines the experimental periods involving 
the 30-30-20-40 target. In each table, the experimental observation of the movement 
vector and the theoretical benchmark movement vector are compared using the Euclidean 
norm: 
dist= 
xe{A,B,D,E} 
The results show that at each target level, the CENI benchmarks8 agreed best with the 
experimental observations regarding the flow of units in two ways: (1) averaged over all 
periods, the distance between the actual observations and the CE/VI benchmarks is lower 
than with the monopsony benchmarks, (2) counting periods, the CENI benchmark is 
closer than the others in predicting the outcome in 13 of 21 of the 30-30-30-30 target 
periods and 7 of 10 of the 30-30-20-40 target periods for a total of 20/31 (64%) of the 
periods• 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper constructs a computerized procurement auction capable of handling back haul 
and similar transportation problems involving the transportation of homogeneous goods 
under conditions of limited information about seller costs and a limited number of 
competing sellers. A testbed was developed to provide an initial challenge that any 
process for making back haul decisions must solve. An auction was designed and tested 
through laboratory experiments with cash motivated subjects. The outcomes compared to 
a set of theoretical benchmarks from both competitive and monopsony theory with a 
perfectly informed buyer. 
8 Recall that the CE benchmark and the VI benchmark both predict that the movement of units will 
correspond to an efficient movement of units. TP.us the flows of units in these benchmarks are identical 
even though the costs to the principal vary. 
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The initial results are clear. Such an auction can be constructed and successfully 
implemented. Results 1-3 above summarize our findings relative to the performance 
benchmarks. The auction system produced costs much lower than the cost to the agent if 
the agent performed the functions "in house". Even though the in house cost to the agent 
were public information to the bidders, the auction resulted in lower cost. 
The cost of back haul that resulted from the auction were lower than the negotiated price 
benchmark. The back haul cost to the agent were roughly comparable to what would have 
been the case if the back haul services were provided in a series of competitive markets in 
which prices were equal to marginal cost of the service. This is rather remarkable since 
no such markets existed. 
The auction system did not perform as well as would have been the case of a perfectly 
informed monopsonist, who strategically used buying power to influence prices. Of 
course the combination of such information and buying power is very special set of 
circumstances and if available, there is little need for the firm to consider any form of 
procurement other than price setting. Nevertheless, the all-knowing monopsonist 
measure is an objective yardstick against which the performance of a less informed and 
powerful method of purchase can be measured. Clearly, if the buyer has some knowledge 
of seller costs and the opportunity, a strategic revelation of cost might be a useful tool to 
get back haul costs down even lower; but. such issues are well beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
The auction would not perform as well as an integrated firm that owns all suppliers, is 
fully informed about all costs and provides itself with the services at the lowest possible 
cost based on the perfect information. In a sense such a buyer is even more powerful 
than the perfectly informed monopsonist unless the monopsonist is able to implement 
perfect price discrimination. This measure reflects the best any procurement system 
could do, so it is a natural yardstick to apply. 
Results 2 and 3 tell us that the way to understand this form of back haul auction is by 
application of the competitive model. Under competitive conditions the purchasing firm 
is supplied all aspects at prices equal to the marginal cost of the suppliers. It is quite 
remarkable that the auction performance is similar to that predicted by the competitive 
model given the substantial latitude for strategic behavior, poor coordination missed 
opportunities, etc. From the point of view of potential users, the results suggest that the 
competitive model is the appropriate benchmark. If analysis suggests that organized 
competition would produce lower cost than its current procurement method then the 
purchasing firm should consider this form of auction as a replacement. 
Future analysis should take into consideration the dynamics of the process. The current 
analysis is primarily concerned with the outcomes at the end of each period rather than 
with the process by which the outcomes are achieved. Details of the dynamics may yield 
insights into how to alter the process. For example, an analysis of the bidding process 
might show a tendency towards certain kinds of one stage Nash equilibrium as reported 
for the BICAP auction in Brewer and Plott(1996), or it might operate in a different 
1 5  
manner. Analysis could also be extended to explore major aspects of procurement not 
studied here, such as quality of service, reliability, timing, etc. 
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APPENDIX A: ORIGINAL WEB-BASED INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENTS. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple and if 
you follow them carefully you might earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to you in 
cash. 
You will be trading in an electronic market of a number of market trading periods or days. You will be 
selling items which are supplied to you at a cost. Attached you will find a set of cost sheets, one for 
each period, which describes the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal 
this information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
The currency in this market is called francs. All profits and losses will be in terms of francs. At the end 
of the experiment francs will be converted to dollars at the rate of 
_ 100 __ francs = I US dollar or I franc=_ cents. You will be paid in dollars. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
You will be bidding in a market to provide transportation services to move items among locations. We 
will call the items "units" and the locations will be called A, B, C, and D. This market will be carried 
out using the computer terminals. 
Each period there will be a public announcement about how many units that need to be moved. This 
includes the number to be moved from some locations and the number to be delivered at other 
locations. In the market you will have an opportunity to bid on moving some or all of the units that 
might be moved. You will be able to ask any price that you like for moving units, but the computer will 
have the freedom to reject your bid in favor of another bid. Only if your bid is accepted will you get a 
final contract and you will be paid only on final contracts that you obtain. How this works will be 
explained later. 
Your profit in a period consists of the price you receive on any final contracts minus the cost to you of 
moving the units specified in those contracts. The costs to you of moving units are given on a set of 
attached cost sheets. You only pay these costs if you get a final contract to move the units. 
PERIOD PROFIT= CONTRACT REVENUE (your bid) - TRANSPORTATION COST 
Example: Suppose you get a final contract to move 4 units from A to B and move 3 units from C to D. 
Suppose your bid for all this transportation was 1300. If your cost is 500 for moving 4 units from A to 
B and 450 for moving 3 units from C to D, then your total transportation cost is 500 + 450 = 950. Your 
profit is the contract revenue of 1300 minus the transportation cost of 950: 
profit= 1300-950=350. 
In some periods you might have a profit and other periods you might have a loss. Losses are deducted 
from any profits or other earnings you might have. Your total earnings will be the sum of any profits 
minus the sum of any losses. 
DETERMINATION OF CONTRACTS 
In determining the contracts to be awarded the computer performs a cost minimization calculation. The 
computer is able to move units itself at a cost and it will do so as long as its costs are less than the cost 
of contracts. In other words the computer only agrees to contracts to the extent that it saves itself 
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money. 
The cost to the computer go up when it is required to move things among the various locations itself. 
The formula for calculating the cost to the computer is four times the square of what it moves from a 
location or to a location. That is, if mi is the amount the computer moved from/to, (negative 
mi)/(positive mi), location i then the total cost computer of computer moves is ; 4 m; 2 • { If ni is the 
amount that needs to be moved and x; is the amount moved by contract with subjects then mi = ni- Xi } 
The total cost of moves would be the cost of computer moves plus the cost of contract moves. The table 
will help you develop some intuition about the cost of moves by the computer. This could be useful 
because you know that unless your bid will save the computer money, the computer will do it itself. 
Contracts are selected by the computer to minimize the total cost of movements. That is the computer 
looks among all bids and selects the set of contracts which might be made final. Total cost of a set of 
contracts is the cost of the contracts plus the cost to the computer of those movements not covered by 
the contracts (computed by the above formula). It will always find the lowest total cost set of contracts. 
If you submit a bid that lowers total cost from the computer's point of view, it will be selected. 
When the market opens you are free to submit a bid. The bid will be a proposed movement of units 
from some locations and a deposit of units at some other locations. Your bid will also include the 
amount that you will charge for the movements. 
The computer will announce a set of "tentatively selected" bids. The process will continue in this 
manner until no new bids are submitted. If no new bids are submitted within a specified period of time 
the tentatively selected bids will become the final selection. 
The computer can only accept one bid from you at a time. This should cause no complications. You 
will be free to cancel any bid you make as long as it is not tentatively accepted, and then submit 
another. When bids are tentatively accepted they cannot be canceled so be sure that you have not made 
a mistake and are willing to deliver on a bid before you send it in. Since the computer will always 
accept "better" bids, you can always "improve" your bid by submitting the old bid, the tentatively 
selected one, augmented by however you might want. The old bid will be "deselected" and replaced by 
your new bid. 
HOW TO USE THE COMPUTER 
Logging On - You should already be logged on. This is in case you get lost. 
I. Open Netscape. 
II. Go to the URL: http://eeps2.caltech.edu/�transexp 
Getting the Current List of Contracts 
From the login page, click on: 
"Examine the Current Potential Allocation" 
This data changes rapidly as new bids are entered in the market. 
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How to Read the List of Contracts 
The computer constantly calculates what it will do if no further offers come in. BLUE contracts would 
be accepted if no further bids were sent in. 
RED contracts would NOT be accepted if no further bids were sent in. 
Other Items on the contract page 
Buyer DEMAND: Number of units that must be moved at each location. 
Bidder Total: Total units that would be moved by BLUE contracts. 
Buyer Makeup: The units that would have to be moved by the computer. 
Makeup Costs: The cost of the computer moving the units itself. 
(Makeup Cost = 4 *makeup2) 
Total Costs to BUYER: The cost of the BLUE contracts + Makeup Costs 
Remember, the computer is the BUYER, and it always looks for minimum costs. 
Sending in a Offer to Move Units 
Go to the Bid Submission Form (an example is attached) 
If not on the bid form, click on Bidding Forms at bottom of page to get it. 
You must enter all the required data for your offer to be processed. 
Enter your id number and password at the top of the bid form. 
(You must do this each time you bid) 
I. Enter the price you wish to charge for moving these units. 
II. Enter the number of units you will pick up and drop off at each location. 
III. Check for accuracy. It is difficult for us to correct typos. 
IV. Click on SEND to send it. Nothing happens until SEND is hit. 
Making a New Offer 
If you make a MISTAKE or TYPO, you must bring it to our attention as soon as 
possible so that we can erase it. Otherwise, you may be required to honor the 
offer. 
If your contract is in BLUE, that is if it is potentially accepted, then you can only 
change the contract in ways that lowers the computer's total moving cost. For 
example, you could reduce the price. 
If your contract is in RED, that is if it is not potentially accepted, then you can make any change that 
you like, such as: raising or lowering the price, change the number of units moved, or withdrawing the 
offer. 
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Bid Submission Form 
. I  
ID Number: Password: ' 
Cash Asking Price: 
Pick Up Units: 
Deliver Units: 
* 
! SEND I CLEAR 
This form can be used to: 
• submit a new bid 
A: 
D: 
• revise an existing bid 
Top of Form 
B: 
E: 
Revision of bids tltat are in tlte blue/acceptable state is limited to those tltat 
lower tlte price or provide better service, as decided by tlte computer. 
• remove a bid in the b state 
To remove a bid, fill in ID and PASSWORD and hit SEND, leaving the 
other fields blank. 
Abort and return to Horne Page. 
Be sure to double-check your entries before hitting SEND. 
Bottom of Form 
2 1  
Table 1. Marginal costs of movement in the testbed of twelve agents. 
ti Marginal Cost Marginal Cost Marginal Cost Marginal Cost 
Route A to D Route A to E Route B to D Route B to E 
---------unit--------- ---------unit--------- ---------unit--------- ---------unit---------
1 sr 2"a 3ra 4m 1sr 2110 3ra 4'" 1 sr 2nu 3ru 4111 1" 2nu 3ru 4"' 
1 9 2 1 6  225 432 1 92 264 276 372 132 264 396 407 72 96 2 1 6  240 
2 1 8  207 279 423 1 80 252 348 384 121  253 330 4 1 8  66 90 2 1 0  234 
3 27 198  234 4 1 4  1 68 240 288 396 1 10 242 385 429 60 84 204 228 
4 36 1 89 288 405 156 228 360 408 99 23 1 3 1 9  440 54 78 198  222 
5 45 1 80 243 396 144 2 1 6  300 420 88 220 374 45 1 6 30 150 174 
6 54 1 7 1  297 3 87 12 132 204 432 77 209 308 462 12  36  1 56 1 80 
7 63 1 62 252 378 120 3 12 444 576 66 198  363 473 1 8  42 1 62 186 
8 72 153  306 369 24 108 456 564 55 1 87 297 484 24 48 1 68 1 92 
9 8 1  144 26 1 360 96 324 468 552 44 1 76 3 52 495 102 126 246 270 
10  90 1 3 5  3 1 5  3 5 1  36 84 480 540 33 1 65 286 506 108 1 32 252 276 
1 1  99 126 270 342 72 336 492 528 22 1 54 341  5 17 1 14 1 3 8  258 282 
12 108 1 17 324 333 48 60 504 5 1 6  1 1  143 275 528 120 144 264 288 
Table 2. Supply functions for movement along each route. 
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Table 3. (4P+Q) Monopsony benchmark outcomes along route ad. 
Q Total p p p p s s s s Quota Quota Quota Quota 
Cost 1 u n it 2units 3units 4un its 1 un it 2un its 3un its 4un its 1 un its 2un its 3un its 4un its 
1 1 0  1 0  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2 38 1 9  0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
3 84 28 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
4 1 48 37 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
5 230 46 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
6 330 55 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 
7 448 64 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 
8 556 55 226 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 1 0 0 
9 674 64 226 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 1 0 0 
1 0  782 55 226 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 2 0 0 
1 1  900 64 226 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 2 0 0 
1 2  1 008 55 226 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 3 0 0 
1 3  1 1 26 64 226 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 3 0 0 
1 4  1 234 55 226 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 4 0 0 
1 5  1 352 64 226 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 4 0 0 
1 6  1 460 55 226 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 5 0 0 
1 7  1 578 64 226 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 5 0 0 
1 8  1 686 55 226 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 6 0 0 
1 9  1 81 2  46 226 0 0 5 7 0 0 5 7 0 0 
20 1 956 37 226 0 0 4 8 0 0 4 8 0 0 
21  2 1 1 8  28 226 0 0 3 9 0 0 3 9 0 0 
22 2298 1 9  226 0 0 2 1 0  0 0 2 1 0  0 0 
23 2496 1 0  226 0 0 1 1 1  0 0 1 1 1  0 0 
24 271 2  0 226 0 0 0 1 2  0 0 0 1 2  0 0 
25 2938 0 226 452 0 0 1 1  1 0 0 1 1  1 0 
26 3 1 82 0 226 461 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 
27 3444 0 226 470 0 0 9 3 0 0 9 3 0 
28 3724 0 226 479 0 0 8 4 0 0 8 4 0 
29 4022 0 226 488 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 5 0 
30 4337 0 226 479 839 0 7 4 1 0 7 4 1 
31  4635 0 226 488 839 0 6 5 1 0 6 5 1 
32 4968 0 226 479 848 0 6 4 2 0 6 4 2 
33 5337 0 226 470 857 0 6 3 3 0 6 3 3 
34 5737 0 226 524 867 0 3 8 1 0 3 8 1 
35 6086 0 226 506 884 0 4 5 3 0 4 5 3 
36 641 2  0 226 524 884 0 2 8 2 0 2 8 2 
37 6775 0 226 524 885 0 2 7 3 0 2 7 3 
38 7 1 1 4  0 226 5 1 5  893 0 2 6 4 0 2 6 4 
39 7464 0 0 532 892 0 0 9 3 0 0 9 3 
40 7828 0 0 532 893 0 0 8 4 0 0 8 4 
41  8 1 66 0 0 523 901 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 5 
42 8550 0 0 523 902 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 6 
43 8940 0 0 5 1 4  9 1 0  0 0 5 7 0 0 5 7 
44 9344 0 0 5 1 4  91 1 0 0 4 8 0 0 4 8 
45 9786 0 0 505 91 9 0 0 3 9 0 0 3 9 
46 1 02 1 0  0 0 505 920 0 0 2 1 0  0 0 2 1 0  
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Table 4. Theoretical benchmarks for the testbed environment. 
Target Mr 30-30-30-30 I 
Principal's Total Cost = Pickups Del iveries Price per u n it moved 
Cost of Moving Units + (where appl icable) 
Cost of Unmoved U nits 
Benchmark Total Cost Cmovlng Cunmoved D E Pad Pae pbd Pbe 
VI 3374 2574 800 A (22) 1 3  9 --- --- --- ---
Vertical B (24) 9 1 5  
Integration (22) (24) 
1 P  52 1 8  3434 1 784 A (1 8) 1 1  7 1 00 85 89 79 
Monopsony B (21 )  8 1 3  
One Price ( 1 9) (20) 
4P+Q 4528 3624 904 A (23) 1 7  6 --- --- --- ---
Monopsony B (22) 6 1 6  
Nonl inear P (23) (22) 
CE 5642 4842 800 A (22) 1 3  9 1 20 1 09 1 04 9 1  
Competitive to to B (24) 9 1 5  to to to to 
Equi l ibrium 5985 5 1 85 (22) (24) 1 27 1 2 0  1 1 1  97 
SC 7500 7396 1 04 A (26) 1 5  1 1  --- --- --- ---
Sequential to to B (30) 1 2  1 8  
Contracting 1 4400 1 4296 (27) (29) 
Target Mr 30-30-20-40 I 
Principal's Total Cost = Pickups Del iveries Price per u n it moved 
Cost of Moving U nits + (where appl icable) 
Cost of Unmoved Un its 
Benchmark Total Cost Cmoving Cunmoved D E Pad Pae pbd Pbe 
VI 3546 2658 888 A(2 1 )  1 0  1 1  --- --- --- ---
Vertical B(25) 6 1 9  
Integration ( 1 6) (30) 
1 P  5493 3397 2096 A(1 7) 8 9 73 1 09 56 97 
Monopsony B(2 1 )  5 1 6  
One Price ( 1 3) (25) 
4P+Q 4932 361 2  1 320 A(2 1 )  1 2  9 --- --- --- ---
Monopsony B(22) 4 1 8  
Non l inear P ( 1 6) (27) 
CE 601 9 5 1 31 888 A(2 1 )  1 0  1 1  96 1 44 67 1 1 5  
Competitive to to B(25) 6 1 9  to to to 
Equi l ibrium 6239 5351 ( 1 6) (30) 1 00 78 1 2 1  
SC 7391 731 1 80 A (27) 1 1  1 6  --- --- --- ---
Sequential to to B (29) 8 2 1  
Contracting 1 5200 1 51 2 0  ( 1 9) (37) 
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Table 5. Experiment parameters and level of observed activity. 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Mi=(30,30,30,30) Mi=(30,30,30,30) Mi=(30,30,30,30) Mi=(30,30,20,40) Mi=(30,30,20,40) 
Experiment Date Periods Time Asks Time Asks Time Asks Time Asks Time Asks 
Time (sec) (sec) (sec) (sec) (sec) 
1 96092 1 5 597 96 464 94 473 97 479 97 475 104 
12noon 
2 96092 1 5 680 1 16 599 143 583 129 602 1 3 1  594 137 
5pm 
3 96092 1 3 19 13  3 0 1  362 88 329 44 - - - - - - --- ---
8pm 
4 961 130 5 938 127 8 1 8  1 1 6  1 03 1  134 670 1 1 3 1 759 285 
5pm 
5 96 1201 5 1447 1 64 841 104 832 90 1 836 249 1 793 205 
4pm 
6 970 1 1 1  4 1300 23 1 1509 252 2553 456 2228 405 - - - ---
l pm 
7 970 1 1 1  4 2865 580 2309 386 2 1 09 386 1 942 404 --- ---
8pm 
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Table 6. Observed final allocations for each experimental period. 
Target Pickups Deliveries 
(30,30, 30,30) 
Experiment Period Total Moving Unmoved Un its MA Ms Mc Mn 
Cost Cost Cost Moved 
1 1 7349 5325 2024 39 1 6  23 1 5  24 
2 7860 6 1 00 1 760 40 1 6  24 1 8  22 
3 7277 5781 1 496 41  20 21  18  23 
2 1 6392 4928 1 464 41  1 9  22 21  20 
2 6297 5 1 69 1 1 28 44 1 9  25 20 24 
3 6427 4883 1 544 41  1 7  24 20 2 1  
3 1 5708 4884 824 47 20 27 21 26 
2 7093 5453 1 640 40 1 9  21  18  22 
3 7883 6051 1 832 39 1 7  22 1 8  2 1  
4 1 8294 5430 2864 34 1 3  21  1 5  1 9  
2 6005 4797 1 208 43 2 1  22 1 9  24 
3 6088 5240 848 46 21  25 21  25 
5 1 5501 4885 6 1 6  48 22 26 23 25 
2 6 1 07 5203 904 45 22 23 22 23 
3 601 6 491 2  1 1 04 44 1 9  25 21  23 
6 1 5942 4974 968 45 20 25 21  24 
2 5 1 26 451 0  6 1 6  4 8  22 26 23 25 
3 5976 51 1 2  864 46 20 26 22 24 
7 1 5 1 71 4235 936 45 21 24 21  24 
2 6 1 86 521 8  968 45 2 1  24 20 25 
3 61 1 4  5 1 62 952 45 20 25 23 22 
Target Pickups Deliveries 
(30,30, 20,40) 
Experiment Period Total Moving Unmoved Un its MA Ms Mc Mn 
Cost Cost Cost Moved 
1 4 7262 5 1 74 2088 39 1 5  24 14 25 
5 7046 5750 1 296 44 1 9  25 1 7  27 
3 4 681 2 5588 1 224 44 1 8  26 1 5  29 
5 6721 5625 1 096 47 1 9  26 1 6  2 9  
4 4 7220 5804 1 4 1 6  43 1 8  25 1 6  2 7  
5 5436 4396 1 040 46 1 9  27 1 7  29 
5 4 6224 5448 776 48 2 1  27 1 8  30 
5 5831 5055 776 48 21 27 1 8  30 
6 4 6049 531 3 736 48 22 26 1 8  30 
7 4 5651 4875 776 48 2 1  27 1 8  30 
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Table 7 A. Comparison of theoretical movement benchmarks with experimental 
observations. MT=(30,30,30,30) 
Observed Distance from Theoretical Benchmarks 
Pickups Del iveries (Euclidean norm) 
Experiment Period MA Ms Mc Mo CENI 1 P  4P+Q 
MA, Ms,  Mc, Mo MA, Ms, Mc, Mo MA, Ms, Mc, Mo 
22,24,22, 24 1 8,2 1 , 1 9,20 23,22,23,22 
1 1 1 6  23 1 5  24 9.27 6.32 1 0.86 
2 1 6  24 1 8  22 7.48 4.24 8 .83 
3 20 21  1 8  23 5.48 3.74 6.00 
2 1 1 9  22 2 1  20 5.48 2.45 4.90 
2 1 9  25 20 24 3.74 5.83 6. 1 6  
3 1 7  24 20 21  6. 1 6  3.46 7.07 
3 1 20 27 21  26 4.24 8 .94 7.35 
2 1 9  21  1 8  22 6. 1 6  2.45 6.48 
3 1 7  22 1 8  21  7.35 2.00 7.87 
4 1 1 3  2 1  1 5  1 9  1 2. 8 1  6.48 1 3. 1 9  
2 21  22 1 9  24 3.74 5. 1 0  4.90 
3 21  25 2 1  25 2 .00 7.35 5. 1 0  
5 1 22 26 23 25 2.45 9.06 5. 1 0  
2 22 23 22 23 1 .41  6. 1 6  2.00 
3 1 9  25 2 1  23 3.46 5.48 5.48 
6 1 20 25 21 24 2.45 6.32 5. 1 0  
2 22 26 23 25 2.45 9.06 5. 1 0  
3 20 26 22 24 2 .83 7.35 5.48 
7 1 21  24 21  24 1 .41 6. 1 6  4.00 
2 21  24 20 25 2 .45 6.63 5. 1 0  
3 20 25 23 22 3. 1 6  6.32 4.24 
Average Distance from Benchmarks 4.57 5.76 6.21 
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Table 7B. Comparison of theoretical movement benchmarks with experimental 
observations. Mr =(30,30,20,40) 
Observed Distance from Theoretical Benchmarks 
Pickups Del iveries (Euclidean norm) 
Experiment Period MA Ms Mc Mo CENI 1 P  4 P+Q 
MA, Ms, Mc, Mo MA, Ms, Mc,  Mo MA, Ms, Mc,  Mo 
21 ,25, 1 6,30 1 7,2 1 , 1 3,25 2 1 ,22 , 1 6,27 
1 4 1 5  24 14 25 8 . 1 2  3 .74 6 .93 
5 1 9  25 1 7  27 3.74 6.32 3.74 
2 4 1 8  26 1 5  29 3.46 6.78 5.48 
5 1 9  26 1 6  29 2.45 7.35 4 .90 
4 4 1 8  25 1 6  27 4.24 5.48 4.24 
5 1 9  27 1 7  29 3. 1 6  8.49 5 . 83 
5 4 2 1  27 1 8  30 2 .83 1 0. 1 0  6. 1 6  
5 21  27 1 8  30 2 .83 1 0. 1 0  6. 1 6  
6 4 22 26 1 8  30 2.45 1 0.00 5.48 
7 4 21  27 1 8  30 2 .83 1 0. 1 0  6. 1 6  
Average Distance from Benchmarks 3.61 7.85 5.51 
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Figure 8A. Comparison of observed cost tradeoffs achieved in the experiments with 
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Figure 8B. Comparison of observed cost tradeoffs achieved in the experiments with 
theoretical benchmarks. Mr=(30,30,20,40) 
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